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Time magazine recently called it “The Twentieth Century Blues.” Canadian philosopher 
George Grant has written of the “darkness which envelops the Western world.” Betty 
Friedan, in The Feminine Mystique in 1963, referred to a “quiet desperation” among 
suburban American housewives “the problem with no name.” Most Americans since 
then, and certainly most Earthlings, have experienced “the problem” in their own lives. If 
nothing else, it is the grist of daily journalism: runaway murder and suicide rates, brutal 
mass layoffs of formerly secure employees, rising poverty and family violence, unceasing 
civil wars, poisoned air and water and soil, pandemic extinctions of plant and animal 
species, glaciers melting and food crops failing as the climate heats up in a thickening 
cloud of carbon gases around the world. 
Social historian Kirkpatrick Sale, in his eighth luminous book in three decades, has given 
a name to “the problem with no name.” He calls it “technology.” He calls it “innovation.” 
He calls it “machinery” in the service of industrialism, and therefore “hurtful,” he writes, 
to human “commonality” and global well-being. 
Sale’s new book is Rebels Against the Future: The Luddites and Their War on the 
Industrial Revolution, Addison Wesley, 1995. Like other of his books, it is part social 
history and scholarship, part novel in the spirit of Zola, and part advocacy on behalf of 
planet Earth “the only living planet in the universe” which he stubbornly calls the 
“biosphere.” Sale declares in his opening sentence that he shares an “affinity for the ideas 
and passions that motivated the subjects of this book, particularly their abiding sense that 
a world dominated by the technologies of industrial society is fundamentally more 
detrimental than beneficial to human happiness and survival.” 
Sale argues that “human happiness” in central England, prior to the Luddite rebellion 
there in 1811 and 1812, was rooted like an oak in three and four centuries of stable family 
and community life. Most of the families worked together in the wool and cotton trades 
that accounted for the bulk of England’s lucrative export market. This was cottage 
industry in the purest sense of the phrase. “Work usually involved some bodily skill,” 
writes Sale,--like combing, spinning and weaving wool—”and some mental agility, often 
a craft in which a person would take some pride, usually with the family pitching in and 
with occasions for songs and stories and gossip the while, and when times were good it 
was possible to lay by a shilling or two and when work was slack there was always a 
garden and a few animals to fall back on.” 
Not that life in these cottage communities was wholly idyllic, without travail and discord, 
even before “the problem” emerged. Sale notes that the “cottage weaver” often toiled in 
“damp and crowded quarters,” was generally beholden to merchant suppliers and buyers 
of his “finished goods,” and so was “part of an ’outworker proletariat’ long before the 
power loom was perfected.” Sale notes further that patriarchy “was the norm in the 
countryside villages” though women could “earn an equal social status” with men that 
children entered the work force at an early age, and that “life was usually as bare and 
simple and functional as the furniture in the parlor.”
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Nonetheless, Sale contends, “it had its virtues,” not only in terms of family cohesion and 
self-reliance but also and perhaps especially in terms of municipal fraternity and 
collective well-being. The “close-knit villages” of Nottinghamshire, Lancashire and 
Yorkshire, where these tens of thousands of families lived, “functioned as true 
communities,” writes Sale, with a “common culture” and “traditional relationships among 
masters and journeymen, workers and merchants, cottagers and squires, parishioners and 
parsons. And central to it all (emphasis added) was a moral custom that was the 
framework upon which all social and economic relations hung, in large measure based on 
mutual aid and reciprocity over the back fence . . . and on honesty and fairness in the 
workplace and market . . . and on an abomination of anything that would upset or alter 
that custom, including innovations and technologies imposed from without.” 
Starting roughly in 1785, which marked the introduction of the “steam-powered factory” 
in England, the traditional cottagers of the textile districts were increasingly threatened 
and set upon by “innovations and technologies imposed from without.” The principal 
source of this imposition was a new breed of capitalist evolving in England under the 
banner of Adam Smith, an ambitious coterie of inventors, manufacturers and marketeers 
who were able quickly to enlist the apparatus of the British state in behalf of their lunge 
for wealth and power. By 1800, writes Sale, “some 2,191 steam engines were thought to 
be at work in Britain those—‘Stygian forges with their fire-throats and never-resting 
sledge-hammers’ that Carlyle wrote of.” By 1813, “there were an estimated 2,400 textile 
looms operating by steam, but that burgeoned to 14,150 by 1820 and exploded to more 
than 100,000 just a decade later.” At which point, writes Sale, “according to a 
contemporary expert, one man could do the work that two or three hundred men had done 
at the start of the Industrial Revolution, ‘the most striking example of the dominion of 
human science over the powers of nature of which modern times can boast.’” 
Hence, in cruelly short order, the artisans and their families in the textile districts were 
absorbing the brunt of what Sale calls the “First Industrial Revolution.” (Sale argues that 
a “Second Industrial Revolution” was triggered in 1971 with the “master technology” of 
the digital computer about which more below.) Many of the artisans of course lost their 
jobs in the industrial onslaught, and those who found work at “Stygian forges” found 
themselves essentially enslaved. “While the engine works,” wrote a doctor of the period, 
quoted by Sale, “the people must work. Men, women, and children are thus yoke-fellows 
with iron and steam: the animal machine—fragile at best, subject to a thousand sources of 
suffering, and doomed, by nature in its best state, to a short-lived existence, changing 
every moment, and hastening to decay—is matched with an iron machine insensible to 
suffering and fatigue.” 
And yet, writes Sale, “at bottom the workers’ grievance was not just about the 
machinery—it never was just the machinery throughout all these years-but what the 
machinery stood for, the palpable, daily evidence of their having to succumb to forces 
beyond their control . . . that were taking away their livelihoods and transforming their 
lives.” The diabolical “logic of the machine,” to paraphrase Sale, quickly infected whole 
communities, driving a wedge of profit-hunger between traditional artisans and local 
owners of the new technology. “This was the morality of industrial capital, and it 
apparently had no place in it for the morality of a society were the well-being of the 
workers and their work, the salubrity of family and community, mattered most.” 
In any case, the preliminary tactic of petitions and letters and pleas to capitalists and 
government officials having failed, a small band of textile workers in Nottinghamshire 
decisively launched the Luddite rebellion on November 4, 1811. Their target wasn’t a 
steam-powered textile mill, although not a few of them bulked in the region, but rather 
the house of a “master weaver” named Hollingsworth who had recently installed some 
“hated machines” of the job-killing kind. In the darkness, writes Sale, the raiders 
“blackened their faces or pulled up scarves, hoisted their various weapons, hammers, 
axes, pistols, ’swords, firelocks, and other offensive weapons’ (as one report had it) and 
marched in more or less soldierly fashion to their destination.” Posting a guard, they 
broke into the house and smashed a half- dozen of Hollingsworth’s “frames,” or “cut-up” 
machines, and then disbanded only to return some six nights later to finish the job. This 
time, however, they were met by gunfire, and one of the raiders, a weaver named John 
Westley, was mortally wounded. “Proceed, my brave fellows,” he reportedly exclaimed, 
“I die with a willing heart.” His comrades, writes Sale, “bore the body to the edge of a 
nearby woods and then returned ’with a fury irresistible by the force opposed to them’ 
and broke down the door while the family and the guards escaped by the back door. They 
then smashed the frames and apparently some of the furniture, and set fire to the house, 
which was gutted within an hour; the men dispersed into the night, never identified, never 
caught.” 
Thus erupts the boisterous tragedy of Luddism, a brief but seminal and instructive 
episode in the annals of Western industrialism, which Sale narrates with the flair of a 
novelist. (He points out early, by the way, that the famous namesake of the Luddite 
rebellion—often referred to by the rebels themselves in public declarations as “Captain” 
or “General Edward Ludd”—didn’t exist at the time of the revolt and may never have 
existed, save in the person of a boy in Leicester some 20 years before who may have 
smashed a knitting machine.) It is a story, writes Sale, of “pseudonymous letters, night-
time raids, quasi-military operations, secrecy and solidarity, and a campaign to instigate 
fear, or alarm, or dread in the hearts of those at whom it is aimed.” It is also a story of 
ruthless suppression by a British state whose armed dragoons and magistrates mistaking a 
leaderless, inchoate uprising for a disciplined revolution would stop at nothing to protect 
the interests of England’s new industrial elite. 
In its later months, when the rebellion spread from Nottinghamshire to Lancashire and 
Yorkshire, “it adds on public demonstrations, attacks on factories (including one which 
claims the lives of ten Luddites), arson and burglary as its character hardens and the raids 
become more frequent, sometimes frenzied, even in the face of growing numbers of 
troops.” Particularly in Yorkshire, Sale observes, “Luddism rises to its most imposing 
form, rooted as it is in communities with long heritages and strong allegiances, and here 
there are clearer signs of an authentic insurrection—armed raids and the hoarding of 
weapons, the voice of a true rebel raised now and again, and eventually even 
assassination—and here the wave crashes against unyielding breaker rocks and is largely 
spent, only little more than a year after it begins.” 
By January 1813 at the latest, when 14 rebels are strung from the gallows on a single day, 
the Luddites have lost, “their howl drowned out by the deafening noise of the factory 
engine.” But Sale hasn’t finished by a long shot. He marches on for 75 pages, mainly 
skewering and demythologizing the “post-industrial” computer age, which Sale insists is 
not remotely post-industrial. He argues that the modern computer and attendant 
technologies now in the hands of the international corporate state are the driving force of 
the “Second Industrial Revolution” mentioned above with grave implications for human 
“commonality” and global well-being. 
Sale is aware that the “computer age” has far more champions and defenders at this point 
than it has detractors. He acknowledges, too, that some industrial processes have been 
cleaned up and made more efficient by the application of computer-based technologies, 
just as he acknowledges that a certain small quantum of the world’s population has 
benefited more than it has been damaged by those technologies—at least so far. But in 
sum, he concludes, the basic and ultimately corrosive “currents” of the First Industrial 
Revolution are fully present and working their evil in the Second. He lists those 
“currents” as the following: (1) “The Imposition of Technology,” (2) “The Destruction of 
the Past,” (3) “The Manufacture of Needs,” (4) “The Service of the State,” (5) “The 
Ordeal of Labor,” (6) “The Destruction of Nature.” 
Sale is persuasive in his treatment of these “currents,” showing how each interacts with 
the others to produce “the problem” afflicting the denizens of the late 20th century. 
He is especially persuasive—in fact compelling—in his treatment of number six: “The 
Destruction of Nature.” He writes: 
[It is] “characteristic of industrialism, to make swift and thorough use of 
nature’s stored-up treasures and living organisms, called ’resources,’ 
without regard to the stability or sustainability of the world that provides 
them—a process ratified by such industrial ideologies as humanism, which 
gives us the right, materialism, which gives us the reason, and rationalism, 
which gives us the method. But it was not until industrialism grew into its 
high-tech phase, with the immense power-multiplier of the computer, that 
this exploitation of resources escalated onto a new plane different not only 
in degree, with exhaustion, extermination, despoliation, and pollution at 
unprecedented and accelerating rates, but in kind, creating that 
technosphere so immanent in our lives, artificial, powerful, and global, and 
fundamentally at odds with the biosphere. What Carlyle saw as the 
economy’s ’war with Nature’ in the 19th century has, like all warfare, 
become a vastly more thorough force in the 20th. 
Not surprisingly, Sale makes clear toward the end of his book that he is sympathetic to 
the efforts of activists in America and abroad to conceive and execute a “Neo-Luddite” 
revolt against modern technology run amok. Indeed, he cites the provisions of a “Neo-
Luddite Manifesto” authored by a woman named Chellis Glendinning. But Sale is too 
watchful and intellectually honest to be optimistic in the near term. Despite his references 
to hopeful signs of effective opposition to industrialism—among them such thinkers as 
Wendell Berry and Jeremy Rifkin and such organizations as Greenpeace—seems to be 
persuaded that “the problem” he has named will not be contained in time for salvation. 
On the contrary, he seems to be persuaded that the Second Industrial Revolution—a 
global Frankenstein ravaging the planet in quest of more profit for its corporate masters, 
reducing all life to market commodities—will continue laying waste to the biosphere until 
“civilization” simply collapses in one or another variant of apocalypse. 
Assuming there are survivors, he writes, it will be necessary for those “survivors to have 
some body of lore, and some vision of human regeneration, that instructs them in how 
thereafter to live in harmony with nature and how and why to fashion their technologies 
with the restraints and obligations of nature intertwined, seeking not to conquer and 
dominate and control the species and systems of the natural world—for the failure of 
industrialism will have taught the folly of that—but rather to understand and obey and 
love and incorporate nature into their souls as well as their tools.” 
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